UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

C.M., et al.,

Plaintiffs, CV-19-05217-PHX-SRB

V.

United States of America,

Defendant.

Plaintiffs, CV-20-00065-PHX-SRB

V.

Phoenix, Arizona
April 26, 2022

Defendant.)

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, SENIOR JUDGE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS DISCOVERY DISPUTE HEARING

(Proceedings conducted via Zoom)

Official Court Reporter:
Teri Veres, RMR, CRR
Sandra Day O'Connor U.S. Courthouse, Suite 312
401 West Washington Street, Spc. 38
Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2151
(602) 322-7251

Proceedings Reported by Stenographic Court Reporter Transcript Prepared by Computer-Aided Transcription

1	APPEARANCES
2	(All counsel appearing via Zoom)
3	For the Plaintiffs C.M., et al.:
4	ARNOLD & PORTER KAY SCHOLER, LLP By: Diana E. Reiter, Esq.
5	Lucy Sarah McMillan, Esq. Kaitlyn Schaeffer, Esq.
6	Erik Walsh, Esq.
7	250 W. 55th Street New York, New York 10019
8	ARNOLD & PORTER KAY SCHOLER, LLP
9	By: Emily Anne Reeder-Ricchetti 601 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, D.C. 20001
10	NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER
11	BY: Mark Feldman, Esq. 224 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 600
12	Chicago, Illinois 60604
13	OSBORN MALEDON, P.A. By: BriAnne Nichole Illich Meeds, Esq.
14	2929 North Central Avenue, 21st Floor Phoenix, Arizona 85012-2793
15	KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY, MESSING, FEINBERG & LIN, LLP
16	By: Jonathan Howard Feinberg, Esq. The Cast Iron Building
17	718 Arch Street, Suite 501 South Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106
18	For the Plaintiffs A.P.F., et al.:
19	COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP
20	By: Teresa Sanghee Park, Esq. Kristin Marie Cobb, Esq.
21	850 10th Street NW Washington, D.C. 20001-4596
22	COPPERSMITH BROCKELMAN
23	By: Keith Beauchamp, Esq. 2800 North Central Avenue, Suite 1900
24	Phoenix, Arizona 85004
25	

1 2 3 4	SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER By: Norma Ventura, Esq. James Knoepp, Esq. Sharada Jambulapati, Esq. P.O. Box 1287 Decatur, Georgia 30031
5	For the Defendant United States of America:
6	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - CIVIL DIVISION
7	By: Philip Davis MacWilliams, Esq. Walter Edward Parker, IV, Esq. P.O. Box 888
8	Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044
9	U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
10	By: Irina Maya Majumdar, Esq. P.O. Box 888 Ben Franklin Station Washington, D.C. 20044
12	washington, b.c. 20044
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18 19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

PROCEEDINGS

(Whereupon the proceedings started at 12:51 p.m.)

1.3

2.2

COURTROOM DEPUTY: Civil case 19-5217, C.M. versus the United States of America, and civil case 20-065, A.P.F. versus the United States of America. Both cases set for discovery dispute hearing.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. Maureen has already taken the names of everyone who is appearing on this video conference, and so the minutes will reflect who has appeared and I would only ask that counsel who are going to be presenting just identify themselves by name before they begin speaking for the court reporter.

So this is the time set for a discovery dispute hearing. May I ask at whose request we are having this conference?

MS. REITER: Your Honor, this is Diana Reiter for the C.M. Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are requesting this conference as to certain issues, and the Defendant is requesting this conference as to other issues.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you begin, then, Ms. Reiter, and tell me what the issues are that you wish to discuss.

MS. REITER: Certainly. And just before we get to the four issues at issue today, I just want to make the Court aware that the Government is seeking to claw back a

1.3

2.2

previously-produced document on the grounds that it's privileged and that Plaintiffs dispute that claim; and since the Government has marked the document as confidential and consistent with the Rule 502(d) order in this case, we plan to file a joint motion seeking leave to file a Motion for Judicial Determination of a Privileged Claim Under Seal.

I don't think there's anything to discuss with respect to that today, Your Honor, unless you have questions, but I just wanted to let you know that was coming.

THE COURT: All right, thank you.

MS. REITER: The parties have a dispute over the Government's deliberative process privilege assertions. Specifically, Plaintiffs have asked the Government to review certain of their deliberative process privilege assertions in connection with their productions from DHS and its agencies and to conform them to the Court's February 24th order on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel.

The Government has refused to do so and we, therefore, seek an order requiring the Government to undertake that review, which I can outline in more detail now or after I've gone through the other issues.

THE COURT: Let's take them one at a time. So discuss the issues with deliberative process first.

MS. REITER: Certainly. Your Honor previously ruled on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel documents improperly reacted

1.3

2.2

based on various privileges; and that motion focused, as you may recall, on two DOJ productions with the idea that the Court's order would provide guidance that would assist the parties in working out privilege disputes with respect to other productions.

As I noted, after that order came down, Plaintiffs asked the Government to review its deliberative process privilege claims for some of the remaining productions and to conform those claims to the Court's order.

The Government declined to do that, and that's why we're here today; and, Your Honor, the history on this issue demonstrates why the Government should be required to perform this requested review.

Notably, every time the Government has been forced to reassess its deliberative process privilege assertions, it has withdrawn a significant percentage of those assertions entirely and has removed other redactions.

So, for example, once faced with defending its privilege claims in response to Plaintiffs' first Motion to Compel, the Government withdrew 82 percent of its original deliberative process privilege claims for those two DOJ productions, and then the Court ordered additional reproductions following its in camera review.

So effectively, the Government has conceded that its original privilege claims were extremely overbroad and, yet,

1.3

2.2

it's declined to reevaluate its privilege assertions for the vast majority of documents which were not subject to that Motion to Compel, and we have tried to reach a resolution on this issue.

When the Government first declined to reevaluate its claims after the February order and in an effort to move the process forward, Plaintiffs asked the Government to review a sample of 57 documents we selected and, again, that review resulted in the Government withdrawing over 33 percent of its privilege claims entirely and then revising redactions for additional documents and revising its privilege log descriptions.

So that exercise confirmed, once again, the extreme overbreadth of the Government's deliberative process privilege claims and the need for the Government to do a more comprehensive re-evaluation of its remaining privilege assertions.

THE COURT: What is the -- what volume of documents are you requesting that they perform this re-evaluation on?

MS. REITER: So, your Honor, the Government, according to their own count, they have asserted privilege claims as to over 8,000 documents.

However, we aren't asking them to review all 8,000. Again, in an order -- in order to respond to their claims of burden, we've requested a more narrow review. Specifically,

1.3

2.2

we've asked only that they review documents from DHS and its agencies.

We also have limited our request consistent with Your Honor's order. So, for instance, we are only asking the Government to review documents related to development and implementation of the Zero Tolerance Policy and Family Separation. We are not asking them to review draft executive orders and draft reports where the final has been produced because we recognize that in Your Honor's February order Your Honor did not require the Government to produce those documents.

So I don't have a precise number for you on the number of documents we're asking them to re-review, but it is likely in the thousands of documents.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. MacWilliams.

MR. MacWILLIAMS: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Phil MacWilliams on behalf of the Defendant United States.

I can start with the number, if that's where the Court wants me to start in terms of responding. According to our calculation, the number of documents over which there's some assertion of the deliberative process privilege, not necessarily a full redaction, but it could be any sort of redaction is about 5,700 documents.

Within this set of documents Plaintiffs are

1.3

2.2

referring to, Ms. Reiter referred to a limited set; but the reality is they are asking the Government to re-review all the DHS documents, including ICE and Customs and Border Protection, really just taking out HHS is what they're asking.

So if you take the HHS documents out of the equation, we're looking at about 5,700 documents that they're asking us to re-review.

THE COURT: So the privilege claims were made before I issued my order in February. Is a re-review not in order in light of that ruling?

MR. MacWILLIAMS: If Plaintiffs want to challenge some documents, Your Honor -- this is where -- one of the areas as to where there's sort of fundamental disagreement with Plaintiffs as to what they're asking and what the next step should be.

First of all, the Government never refused to re-review anything. Our position is if Plaintiffs have documents that they want to challenge, please bring them to our attention and we will re-review them; and the history that Ms. Reiter provided shows that we are willing to work with them and make changes, make alterations to the privilege log.

By no means is it a concession that the privilege assertions were incorrect. Rather, it's, I think, a showing that the Government will work with them and try and move the case forward and avoid a dispute; but what the Government

1.3

2.2

finds wholly unworkable is to say, "Go back and just look at everything again."

There could be documents that Plaintiffs would not want to challenge, are not challenging. We think there should be a discrete set of documents that Plaintiffs want to challenge and key those up for discussion first and then we can -- if there's still a dispute, then we can bring it to the Court. To do a re-review --

THE COURT: Let me ask, Ms. Reiter, why isn't that a reasonable way to proceed rather than simply asking for, essentially, a wholesale re-review of many thousands of documents?

MS. REITER: Your Honor, we think it's unreasonable for several reasons. First, this is a problem of the Government's own making. The record makes clear that they improperly redacted a significant percentage of their documents and that they've known about these issues at least since April 2021, which is when they withdrew the 82 percent of their privilege assertions. So they should have to fix it. The volume is what it is because they have over redacted.

Second, the Government's privilege log descriptions are so inadequate that it is impossible for Plaintiffs to identify with any reliability the most relevant documents. We can't use the context from the documents themselves because so many of the documents have been redacted in their entirety

except from the "to," "from," "subject line" and "date." 1 2 And relatedly, the Court observed in its February 3 order that the Government's privilege log descriptions do not 4 always match the document, which further hampers Plaintiffs' 5 ability to identify the most important documents. 6 And finally, the Government bears the burden to show 7 that the deliberative process privilege applies, and it hasn't 8 done that because its privilege logs are so big that they do 9 not provide the information we need to identify the documents. 10 THE COURT: Okay, I've heard enough on that subject. 11 What's your second subject? 12 MS. REITER: Your Honor, Ms. McMillan's going to 1.3 address the deposition-related issues. 14 MS. McMILLAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Lucy 15 McMillan for the C.M. Plaintiffs. We have three different 16 disputes over depositions. The first two relate to 17 Plaintiffs' intention to notice certain Plaintiff-specific 18 depositions, and the third relates to policy level depositions. 19 20 So as you may recall, the case management order 21 divides the depositions into Plaintiff-specific and policy, 2.2 and the Plaintiff-specific depositions are related to 23 Plaintiff-specific claims. 24 The policy depositions are defined in the order as 25 "depositions of government officials related to the creation,

1.3

2.2

development and implementation of the family separation policy."

So the first dispute concerns two deponents, James

De La Cruz and Elizabeth Strange. Plaintiffs intend to depose
these Plaintiff-specific deponents, but the Government is
objecting and says they are policy deponents.

Mr. De La Cruz was a Senior Federal Field Specialist supervisor in the Office of Refugee Resettlement. He was not involved in the creation, development or implementation of the Family Separation Policy and, instead, he was involved in tracking families, assisting with communications issues and reunifications, including for our clients.

For example, the C.M. team has e-mails from ORR shelters that concern the reunification of two of our clients that Mr. De La Cruz is on. He also sent spreadsheets relating to issues of communication between parents and children and our clients are on some of those spreadsheets, and there are multiple examples that the parties could share; but in short, he appears to have served as sort of like a troubleshooting role relating to tracking, communication and reunification, including issues raised by the shelters that housed our clients.

And Plaintiffs have always said these ideas are -these issues are Plaintiff-specific issues, and so we're
asking to depose him as a Plaintiff-specific deponent.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

So you want to ask him about your two specific Plaintiffs, the reunification that he was personally involved in? MS. McMILLAN: Well, we'd like to ask him about tracking and communication issues. There's many, many spreadsheets that have our clients on them that relate to communication problems and tracking problems and we want to --THE COURT: Well, isn't it likely, then, that he's -- he falls into both categories? MS. McMILLAN: You know, he -- I don't think that he was involved in the creation or implementation of the Family Separation Policy. Those are different categories of people who are involved in developing the policy, pushing it out, making sure it was implemented. He was involved in, if anything, undoing it to some extent; but he was really involved on a granular level as well and, you know, to the extent that he has some knowledge that go beyond our Plaintiffs, I would just point to the

Government's own statements in our recent Joint Discovery Plan, which was submitted in February.

The Government there said referring to discovery as Plaintiff specific and policy level is a helpful way to conceptualize and organize discovery, but there is some overlap. Depositions of witnesses with Plaintiff-specific information may well cover not only the individual experiences

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

of that plaintiff and child, but also touch on any policies or practices in place at the time. Therefore, Plaintiffs' opportunity to learn such information through depositions is not necessarily limited to the ten policy deponents. THE COURT: So, I guess, is the Government objecting to any deposition of Mr. De La Cruz or just to the scope? MR. MacWILLIAMS: Your Honor, first of all, for what it's worth, this is the Government's issue they want to bring -- that they asked for the hearing on; but to answer your question, it's not the deposition itself. It's how it should be counted against Plaintiffs' totals. They were given twelve policy depositions and then fifteen Plaintiff-specific. THE COURT: And they all have -- has that number, then, all been noticed such that they can't add any more in their -- into one category or another? MR. MacWILLIAMS: No. For both categories, Your Honor, they're not done. They still have more to go. THE COURT: Well, why are we fighting about it before we get to the limit and the Plaintiffs want to take No. 13 or No. 16? MR. MacWILLIAMS: Okay, fair question, Your Honor. That is a possibility if that's how you want to handle it. My -- my views, I think the Plaintiffs agreed, was it would be best to get this disagreement ironed out

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

beforehand so we're not in a situation where Plaintiffs --THE COURT: Well, from my perspective, I think I would be in a much better position to iron out No. 13 or No. 16 if they come up, the possibility exists that they won't, and Mr. De La Cruz having been deposed, it would be a lot easier to know which category he fell into. I don't know enough about him and what the Plaintiffs want to ask him to know whether he should be characterized as one of the twelve policy depositions or one of the fifteen Plaintiff-specific. So why don't you just all go ahead with that deposition, and if a dispute comes up later about exceeding the twelve or the fifteen we can resolve it then. MS. McMILLAN: Your Honor, if I may, the -- the issue is that there are more than twelve relevant policy I mean, as you know, this spans many, many deponents. agencies; and so it's difficult for us to plan which twelve to focus on if we're not sure where some of these are going to fall.

THE COURT: I understand your dilemma, but I'm not going to solve it for you.

Tell me about why you want to depose the former United States Attorney for the District of Arizona.

MS. McMILLAN: Yes, your Honor. So Ms. Strange -- we have five -- the C.M. team has five Plaintiff -- adult

1.3

2.2

Plaintiffs. For three of those we have these Border Patrol prosecution memos that list two different ASUAs on them, and two of our clients do not have these prosecution forms at all.

So we want to depose one person who can discuss why our clients were not prosecuted, and we would like to depose the person who ultimately had responsibility to decide whether to prosecute our clients.

You know, we don't want to depose multiple lower level people, especially because some of the lower level people we have deposed so far in other agencies have said that they were simply following orders or that the records themselves were not correct and they were not, in fact, the person who was -- who did a certain task.

So by deposing one person who was ultimately responsible for deciding whether to prosecute our clients, we think that we could get a better understanding of what happened in their cases.

THE COURT: What leads you to believe that she has that specific information?

MS. McMILLAN: Well, you know, we have -- there is some public reporting that during this time -- I understand that, generally speaking, the acting U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Attorney may not be involved in individual cases.

There is some public reporting that at this time she was involved in deciding individual cases. I can't tell you

1.3

2.2

that she was involved in deciding our clients, but she -there is public reporting that she was deciding to decline
cases because of the family separation situation; and so, you
know, based on that, we do believe she was more involved on a
granular level than she may otherwise have been.

THE COURT: Well, I guess if you want to use up one of your depositions on this possibility or probability that the former United States Attorney might have specific information, I'm not sure I want to stop you from doing that; but why wouldn't this be better handled using an interrogatory or two?

MS. McMILLAN: We have served an interrogatory -let's see, yeah, we could serve an interrogatory to ask who it
was she was ultimately responsible. I will note that there
are two clients for which there are no forms whatsoever.

So you're right, we could serve an interrogatory to ask who was the person responsible for declining their prosecutions.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. MacWilliams, why, if at all, are you opposing the deposition of Ms. Strange?

MR. MacWILLIAMS: Your Honor, at this point we're not necessarily opposing the deposition. It's how it should be categorized.

Again, the Government's position is that this should be a policy deposition rather than a Plaintiff-specific

1.3

2.2

deposition, and I think what you're seeing here -- whether you want to decide the issue now or not, what you're seeing here is the problem unfolding and the tactic being used, which is Plaintiffs saying we want to ask about -- in Ms. Strange's example, "Why were our clients not prosecuted?"

That's going to take about five minutes. For the next six, six and a half hours it's going to be all policy related. They want to use this -- they have an abundance of Plaintiff-specific depositions but, as they've acknowledged, they want more policy depositions.

And this is what they're doing, they're using people who should be policy witnesses and are using some kind of a hook to say, "We're going to ask a few questions about our Plaintiffs," and then they're going to veer off into what would clearly be policy-related focus.

So I just want to make sure these depositions are categorized the right way and counted the right way against their totals.

THE COURT: Okay. So I'm not going to categorize them until after they're taken, and if they're not in the category that the plaintiff wants them to be in, they're being taken at that risk.

So what's No. 3?

MS. McMILLAN: The third issue is, again, for Plaintiff-specific depositions whether or not -- depositions

1.3

2.2

that are noticed by the C.M. Plaintiffs and during which the A.P.F. Plaintiffs do not depose or ask questions, whether those should be counted against the A.P.F. total of Plaintiff-specific depositions and vice versa.

So as Your Honor recalls, the A.P.F. Plaintiffs are entitled to eighteen Plaintiff-specific depositions and the C.M. team is entitled to fifteen. The case management order says that if counsel questions a deponent noticed for a Plaintiff-specific deposition in the C.M. case, that deposition is counted against the total authorized in the A.P.F. case.

And so here the C.M. Plaintiffs are planning to notice the depositions of third-party case managers who were responsible for the child plaintiffs in the shelters, and A.P.F. does not believe that any of these individuals were case managers for the A.P.F. Plaintiffs.

The A.P.F. Plaintiffs have decided to issue third-party 30(b)(6) deposition notices for the four shelters where their clients were held instead of the seven case managers that were responsible for their child plaintiffs.

Neither set of lawyers intends to ask questions at the other's depositions. We've even offered to forego attendance at those depositions, even though that was not contemplated in the case management order and so we're -- we think that A.P.F. third-party 30(b)(6) depositions should not

count against C.M. and that the C.M. case workers should not count against A.P.F.

THE COURT: And you think differently, Mr. MacWilliams?

1.3

2.2

MR. MacWILLIAMS: I do, Your Honor. As to the case managers, I can't really speak to that because they haven't been noticed or subpoenaed. I don't know who they're even talking about. So whether there's a dispute there as to whether they should be C.M. or A.P.F. or both, I don't know. There's really nothing to bring to the Court yet on those potential depositions.

What I can speak to is that the A.P.F. Plaintiffs have subpoenaed four of the ORR grantees. The ORR grantees are where the children were placed while they were in the custody of ORR. To be specific, it's Cayuga Centers, Lutheran Social Services, Southwest Key Programs and Bethany Christian Service.

Of those four, the Government's position that three of those should count for -- against C.M. and A.P.F. total because of the overlap of where the children were.

Counsel for C.M. read some language from the Court's case management order, but they kind of skipped over the most important part, which I would like to read. "To the extent there is overlap of individuals who were involved with the separations of the parents and children or in the ORR

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

depositions --

placement of the children in these cases, those depositions will count against the total Plaintiff-specific depositions authorized in each case." So let me go through the numbers. For Cayuga there were three C.M. children, three A.P.F. children. Lutheran, one of each; and Southwest Key, one of each. There's overlap with these ORR grantees, meaning the children were all at the same places -- or at least in the same care of these grantees. So I think that the Court's order clearly contemplated a situation like this where's there's this sort of overlap, that that should be a joint deposition. Okay. I'm agreeing with Mr. MacWilliams THE COURT: on this, that there was -- when these numbers were set and they were set at different numbers for each case, there was -it was contemplated that there would be overlap, and this seems to be the exact situation that was contemplated. When you have the exact same facility that housed children from both of the cases, why would you not count the 30(b)(6) deposition for both? MS. McMILLAN: Well, Your Honor, the C.M. team has decided that it believes deposing the case managers for the children is the strategy we would like to use. We are not planning to attend the 30(b)(6)

```
What if it is the same -- what if it's
1
              THE COURT:
2
    the same person? Do you know that the case managers are
3
    different?
 4
              MS. McMILLAN:
                             I don't know that because we don't
5
    know who the 30(b)(6) deponent -- I would be surprised if it
 6
    was the same person because the case managers are very
7
    specific granular day-to-day with the children and I think
8
    the --
9
              THE COURT: Hold on. For your five plaintiffs, are
10
    they five different case managers?
11
              MS. McMILLAN:
                             They are five different case
12
    managers, yes, yes, and we would prefer to take the case
1.3
    manager rather than a 30(b)(6) deposition; but under
14
    Mr. MacWilliams' position we don't have that choice because
15
    we're running out of depositions if we end up having to take
16
    our case managers and attend the 30(b)(6).
17
              THE COURT: Have you seen a proposed 30(b)(6)
18
    notice?
19
              MS. McMILLAN: Yes, and I -- I will defer to --
20
    Ms. Park is here, too, for the A.P.F. team, but I would say
21
    that it is -- the topics listed are broader than I -- I
2.2
    believe any case manager could answer.
23
              THE COURT:
                         And is there any overlap between the
24
    case managers in the C.M. case and in the A.P.F. case?
25
              MS. McMILLAN: No, the A.P.F. -- well, go ahead
```

Teresa -- I'm sorry, Ms. Park, go ahead.

1.3

2.2

MS. PARK: Your Honor, if I may, Teresa Park for the A.P.F. Plaintiffs. We're happy to answer. To the best of our knowledge, the case managers for our Plaintiffs were seven and they do not overlap, as we understand it, from the C.M. case managers for these facilities and for an additional facility -- or, I'm sorry, or our grantee that Mr. MacWilliams was referring to, and I think -- if I may add a few points.

It's certainly no doubt that our cases are complex and that there are a number of witnesses. For A.P.F. alone, for example, we have twelve Plaintiffs and the Government has identified over 130 individuals in its MIDP responses as having relevant knowledge regarding the case.

Back in 2020 when A.P.F. and the Government were discussing in its various meet and confers and submitting a joint case management report, which the Court ultimately ruled on, the Court had allowed the A.P.F. Plaintiffs eighteen Plaintiff-specific depositions; but what the Government's position would be, in effect, would mean that A.P.F. may be forced to count the deposition of, let's say, a tangential witness because that witness was a key witness for C.M.'s Plaintiffs or vice versa; and here we believe our 30(b)(6) witnesses, although they haven't yet been identified, (technical glitch) themselves did not overlap as we understand it. In effort --

1.3

2.2

THE COURT: Okay, I've heard enough on this one.

I'm going to allow the case managers, the four -I'm sorry, the C.M. case managers' depositions because there's
no overlap between these case managers and the case managers
in the A.P.F. case. They'll only count against the number of
depositions permitted in the C.M. case and not in the A.P.F.
case.

With respect to the 30(b)(6) depositions, they'll not count against the C.M. Plaintiffs so long as C.M. doesn't appear or participate in the questioning in that case. That's my ruling on that one.

Is there another issue?

MS. McMILLAN: Yes, your Honor. The third issue is with respect to two individuals who are -- all parties agree are policy deponents, and the issue is whether they can be deposed now or whether they need to be deferred until a later date.

So, again, as Your Honor is aware, the case management order states that, "Plaintiffs will conduct depositions of current or former Cabinet level officials, heads of agencies, or White House officials or advisors only on agreement of the parties or with the Court's leave," and that the parties shall meet and confer on or before June 3rd to assess the need for these depositions.

The two individuals we would like to depose now are

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

Mr. Albence, who was the Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations at Immigration and Customs Enforcement. THE COURT: Say that again. He was the --MS. McMILLAN: Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations --THE COURT: Okay. MS. McMILLAN: -- at Immigration and Customs Enforcement during the relevant period. So he was not an agency head during the relevant period and he is no longer in the Government. From July 5th, 2019, to August 25th, 2020, a year after the events in question, he was the Acting Director of ICE; but as we have represented to the Government, we do not intend to depose him about the time period when he was Acting Director, only about the time period when he was Executive Associate Director of the Enforcement and Removal Operations.

And similarly, Mr. Wolf was the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of Homeland Security and not an agency head during the relevant time period, and he's no longer in the Government. He was the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security in 2019 to 2021, although a number of Federal Courts subsequently ruled that the appointment was unlawful.

In any event, the Plaintiffs, again, have told the Government we don't intend to depose him about any time when

1.3

2.2

he was the Acting Secretary; and so we are asking to depose these two individuals now and not wait until later because they are critical to the case.

They are on documents that are really key to the facts developed here and will inform decisions about future depositions, and the documents show that they were really crucial to the creation, development and implementation of the policy; and then just on a practical level, I'll note if we can't depose people like Mr. Albence and Mr. Wolf now, it's going to be very hard during a June 3rd meet and confer to discuss which higher-level officials we do need because so many people were either heads of agencies, White House officials during the time or are currently heads of agencies, which we will wait until a later date to depose.

THE COURT: Okay, let me turn to Mr. MacWilliams.

If the Plaintiffs are limiting these depositions to the time periods when they were not acting directors of their agencies but instead had other lesser responsibilities, why shouldn't they go forward now?

MR. MacWILLIAMS: Well, Your Honor, that's entirely your decision, of course. All -- the Government's position is the same as with the other depositions. We're just asking that the plain language of the Court order be followed, and the plain language of the Court order says current or former agency heads can't be deposed right now.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

There's no exceptions for when they were in that role and so on. If the Court wants to grant Plaintiffs' leave to do these depositions now from this particular provision of the order, that's your decision; but the Government's position is if we start -- the Government agrees if we start making exceptions, Plaintiffs are going to keep asking for exceptions of other individuals --THE COURT: Okay --MR. MacWILLIAMS: -- so that's why we can't agree. THE COURT: I think they should go ahead. intention behind that limitation was to depose people who were holding those positions about these -- the issues in this case while they were holding those positions. With respect to Mr. Albence and Mr. Wolf, they're not going to be deposed as agency heads. They're going to be deposed as to what their -- as to actions they took or policies that were being implemented when they held the positions of Executive Assistant Director of Enforcement and Removal for ICE or Chief of Staff to the DHS Director, not in their roles as Acting Director or -- of either Immigration and Customs Enforcement or DHS, but they do count --MR. MacWILLIAMS: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: They do count against the number for policy. MR. MacWILLIAMS: Okay. Thanks, Your Honor.

think we actually agree -- that's one thing the Plaintiffs and 1 2 I agree on, though. 3 Could I have one point, though, about the Wolf and 4 Albence deposition? They are former officials and they have 5 not been subpoenaed yet. So to the extent -- I wanted to make 6 the record clear to the extent the Court's ruling that they 7 can go forward, it just relates this -- the Court's just not 8 applying this one provision to the case management order. 9 There may be other bases for them to object to a deposition 10 once they're subpoenaed. 11 THE COURT: Right, I --12 MR. MacWILLIAMS: So I want to make sure that's out 1.3 there. 14 THE COURT: I understand that the Government does 15 not have control over these individuals and they have to be 16 subpoenaed or accept subpoenas for deposition and, obviously, 17 my ruling today with respect to how this fits into the case 18 management order and the limitations and then is not intended in any way to resolve any other objections that these 19 20 individuals on their own might make to a subpoena. 21 MR. MacWILLIAMS: Understood, Your Honor. 2.2 THE COURT: Okay. Is that it? 23 Your Honor, if I may, I just want to MS. REITER: raise two minor issues related to the privilege issue that we 24 25 discussed earlier.

1.3

2.2

The first is that Plaintiffs would like to request that the Court review in camera 24 documents as to which the Government has maintained its privilege assertions after reviewing the sample that I discussed earlier.

Based on the information available, these documents appear to be highly relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, and it also appears that the Government redacted segregable factual information.

We are prepared to file a Motion to Compel seeking in camera review of those documents with the Court's permission, unless the Government is willing to provide those documents voluntarily and the Court is willing to conduct such a review. That's the first issue, Your Honor.

The second is that the Government's extraordinarily overbroad privilege assertion should not inure to the Government's benefit by preventing Plaintiffs from questioning witnesses about documents that are later produced in response to this dispute.

As you just heard, depositions are already under way. So I just wanted to make clear that Plaintiffs reserve their right to move to reopen depositions of Government witnesses to enable Plaintiffs to question them on subsequently-produced documents that are material to Plaintiffs' case.

THE COURT: Thank you for reminding me that I didn't

1.3

2.2

give you any guidance on these 5,700 documents for which deliberative process privilege was asserted prior to the entry of my order in February.

If these documents are anything like the documents that I reviewed they're not 5,700 discrete documents, but probably numerous copies of the same document with suggestions or red lining -- I think I reviewed -- in the ones that I saw, there were some documents I saw, you know, ten or twelve times.

And I think that it is appropriate in light of the Court's order on deliberative process, Mr. MacWilliams, for the Government to take a second look at these documents and see whether or not its privilege log is still consistent with my order, whether it needs to be -- whether some of the documents need to be produced in light of that order and whether or not the privilege log should be amended to be more clear about the basis for the privilege.

I am persuaded by the fact that when this was undertaken before my in camera review, it resulted in the Government giving the Plaintiffs a tremendous number of documents that had previously been withheld; and I don't have any reason to believe that that wouldn't be the case if these 5,700 documents or whatever smaller number of discrete documents there are were reviewed again, because I think that the order that I entered with respect to deliberative process

1.3

2.2

probably gives clearer guidance than what there was at the time that the privilege log was first made and the documents were withheld or redacted.

MR. MacWILLIAMS: Your Honor, just so I make sure we're clear on this. There was an estimate of there being 5,700 documents total, and then Ms. Reiter talked about the 57 documents they brought to the Government's attention to re-review. I wanted to make sure --

THE COURT: No, she said 24, I thought.

MR. MacWILLIAMS: Well, there were -- there were -- the Plaintiffs said, "Please review these 57 documents," and it made it confusing because on the one hand there's 5,700 documents in the larger set and Plaintiffs said, "Please review these 57," and the Government did that already; and based on that re-review, the Plaintiffs are now challenging 24.

THE COURT: Oh, okay.

MR. MacWILLIAMS: I think that's what Ms. Reiter was talking about. She wants to file a Motion to Compel with respect to those 24 documents that -- for which the redaction still survived following the Government's re-review, and that's what she wants to bring to the Court's attention for an in camera review.

MS. REITER: If I may, that's not accurate. We do want to bring the 24 documents to Your Honor's attention for

1.3

2.2

in camera review; but Your Honor's absolutely correct, our primary request is a re-review of the 5,700 documents that you just discussed.

THE COURT: I think -- and that's what I'm saying I believe is appropriate, Mr. MacWilliams, in light of the Government's change before my in camera review that resulted in a substantially more production than had originally been made with respect to the DOJ documents that I don't have any reason to believe that wouldn't be the same result when the DHS documents were reviewed again.

There was a significant amount of over redaction and claim of deliberative process when it was -- well, it was just done overly broadly based on what I reviewed of the many documents that were the subject of my two prior orders, and we're talking deliberative process here, not attorney-client privilege. So that's my ruling.

MR. MacWILLIAMS: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay, that's my ruling and that's all the time we have today. Thank you very much.

MS. REITER: Your Honor, if I could just ask a clarifying question? With respect to the 24 documents that the Government has already reviewed and that we still dispute the privilege claim for, should we go ahead and file a Motion to Compel in camera review of those documents?

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THE COURT: You may.

```
1
               MS. REITER: Thank you, your Honor.
2
               THE COURT: Okay, thank you very much.
 3
               Court is in recess.
 4
               MS. REITER: Thank you.
5
               MS. McMILLAN: Thank you, your Honor.
 6
7
     (Proceedings ended at 1:33 p.m.)
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, TERI VERES, do hereby certify that I am duly
4	appointed and qualified to act as Official Court Reporter for
5	the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
6	I FURTHER CERTIFY that the foregoing pages
7	constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of all of
8	that portion of the proceedings contained herein, had in the
9	above-entitled cause on the date specified therein, and that
10	said transcript was prepared under my direction and control.
11	DATED at Phoenix, Arizona, this 27th of
12	April, 2022.
13	s/Teri Veres
14	TERI VERES, RMR, CRR
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	